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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the relationship between banks lending and monetary policy 
for banks with different level of capital ratio. We study the relation using the sample of 
U.S. banks over the period 1994 to 2010. We choose short term interest rate, deposit, 
security and GDP as components of monetary policy. We use bank loan change as the 
dependent variable, short term interest rate, deposit, security, GDP change and 1 year 
lagged change as independent variables for the regression model. Our model returns 
significant results for all independent variables except security change lagged variable for 
all three categories and short term interest rate variable for best-capitalized banks. Out 
finding shows that the monetary policy change will significantly affect bank lending 
change with strongest effect on least-capitalized banks and weakest effect on best-
capitalized banks. 
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1.Introduction  
The importance of banks play in the changes of monetary policy has been a very 
hot topic among researchers and economists for over 40 years. In the 1950s, for instance, 
proponents of the “availability doctrine” argued that a bank credit channel provided the 
Federal Reserve with additional leverage in conducting monetary policy. There is a 
controversial debate on the exactly role the banks play. The emphasis of this debate is 
whether there is a relationship between bank lending and monetary policy. So the effects 
of the monetary policy have been widely studied in macroeconomics. Recently, the credit 
channel draws great attention in the debate (Charles S. Morris and Gordon H. Sellon, 
Jr,1995). Credit channel of monetary policy transmission is an indirect amplification 
mechanism that works in tandem with the interest rate channel. The credit channel affects 
the economy by altering the amount of credit firms and/or households have access to in 
equilibrium.  
 Researchers have tested the effectiveness of bank credit channel of monetary 
policy transmission based on the bank-specific data. Earlier empirically tests on the 
existence of the bank credit channel in the United States, Europe and some other 
countries have proved that this credit channel exists. The bank credit channel of monetary 
policy transmission exists because of controversial information in the credit market; 
banks play a unique role by providing loans to some firms which have difficulty in 
getting money from the capital market. This indicates that monetary policy influents the 
credit market (i.e. how much money banks can offer these firms), thus negatively affect 
the performance of these firms. In fact, a failure in banking system may lead to the failure 
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of the economy. However, recently, the financial deregulation has changed the credit 
market in a way which should weaken this credit channel overtime (Thornton,1994, and 
Bernanke and Gertler,1995).  
Banking system has many factors influence the bank behavior. Among these 
factors, bank capital is the main factor partly because of market, technological and 
regulatory forces. Bank capital plays a very important role in banks’ risk management. 
Banks are motivated to minimize capital and given the “liquidity” support extended to 
them by the central bank during the crisis, they are incentivized to turn away offers for 
recapitalization and instead slowly recapitalize by borrowing from the central bank and 
lending out to low-risk ventures such as T-Bonds or AAA Bonds. Bank capital has 
played a vital element in banks’ regulation. Both empirical and theoretical studies on the 
effects that bank capital on bank behavior (i.e. capital requirement under Basel Ⅱ&Ⅲ) 
have attracted more and more attention in recent years (Youbaraj Paudel,2007, and Paula 
Antão and Ana Lacerda,2008). 
This paper primarily focuses on the factors that affect bank lending and whether 
these effects are different among different bank capital amount. It tests the banking 
system in USA between 1994 and 2010. Our message is that the level of bank capital did 
matters the relationship between monetary policy change and bank lending change. The 
monetary policy has strongest effect on least-capitalized banks compare to the weakest 
effect on best-capitalized banks. We find the best-capitalized banks are stable and low 
risk tolerance while the least-capitalized banks are unstable and high risk tolerance. Most 
variables are significant except the security change lagged for all three categories and the 
short term interest rate change for best-capitalized banks. At the same time, data shows 
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the adjustment of short term interest rate will take effect in 1 period after. Overall to say, 
our model successfully prove the relationship between monetary policy and bank lending, 
also shows the difference between different capital levels which confirm the bank capital 
level did affect bank lending and monetary policy in the United States. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous 
theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship of bank lending, monetary policy and 
bank capital. Section 3 explains the variables used in this paper and the summary 
statistics. Section 4 shows and discusses the empirical results by dividing the data in to 
least-capitalized, medium- capitalized and most-capitalized. And compare the results 
among different bank capital. Section 5 is a conclusion part. Appendices part provide 
several tables about how to definition of variables, the empirical studies used in this 
paper and the correlation between factors in the model.  
 
2. Literature Review   
2.1 Theoretical Literature Review 
The lending activity of banks has been attracted considerable attention as an 
important part to the performance of the economy. At late 1994, people noticed that the 
standards for credit risk is too loose as the bank lending becomes larger (see, John A. 
Weinberg,1995).  
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More and more people put a lot of attention to the monetary policy after then. How 
the monetary policy works? Two main ways that bank leading may influence the 
monetary policy transmission process through bank lending.  
First, when the Fed decreases reserves, this strict the amount of loan supply and then 
cut down the bank lending---this is the bank lending channel (see, Jeremy C. Stein, 1998).  
The bank lending channel theorizes that modifications in monetary policy will change the 
supply of credit, especially credit supply in commercial banks. Any changes in monetary 
policy may affect the supply of loanable money available to banks (i.e. a bank's 
liabilities), and then the total amount of loans banks can make (i.e. a bank's assets). That 
is to say, a bank lending channel thinks a tight monetary policy will reduce their loan 
amount due to the decrease in total amount of money that is available to lend.  
However, researchers then concerned about whether or not the monetary policy has 
a direct impact on bank liabilities. The relation between monetary policy and deposits is 
caused by two mechanisms. Traditional thoughts are focus on the ability of the central 
bank can directly control the amount of deposit by regulating banks capital reserve and 
the money multiplier mechanism. Another thought is portfolio substitution arguments 
which show that the monetary policy changes the rate of deposits relative to other assets 
thus change public’s willingness to hold them.  Both of the ideas reveal that monetary 
policy tightening results in reduction of deposits and then condense loan supply. Recently, 
Researchers argue that the emphasis on monetary policy leads to change in deposits is 
misunderstood. They wonder maybe policy has a reverse affect on bank deposits (Piti 
Disyatat, 2011). Furthermore, alternatives in the willingness and the amount banks like to 
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lend, and the movements in interest rate spreads are likely to become a part of 
macroeconomic model.  
Besides, a bank balance sheet channel theorizes that there should be a negative 
relationship between the size of the external finance premium and the borrower's net 
worth (Townsend, Robert. 1979 and Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist. 
1996). For instance, the greater the net worth of the borrower, the more likely she/he uses 
self-financing. Higher net worth borrowers have more collateral for the money they 
borrowed. Thus lenders assume lower risk when lending to higher net worth borrowers. 
The cost of raising external funds will be lower for higher net worth borrowers. 
     Changes in financial positions of borrowers affect their credit and thus induce changes 
in their investment and spending decisions. This idea is like the financial accelerator. The 
mechanism of financial accelerator states that firms’ ability to borrow largely depends on 
the market value of their assets (i.e. their net worth). This relationship is expressed as a 
"collateral-in-advance" constraint (Hart, Oliver and John Moore. 1994). An increase in 
interest rates will reduce the firm’s ability to purchase inputs. 
From a regulatory perspective, capital requirement set the minimum capital the bank 
should hold relative to risk weighted assets. Bank capital is advantageous since it reduce 
the cost of bank failure. But at the same time it costs more because the increase in bank 
capital decreases bank deposits (Gary Gorton and Andrew Winton,2000). Interest rate 
mismatch is one factor of asset-liability mismatch which is the key motivation for the 
bank’s balance sheet position changes (Yener Altunbaş, Gabe de Bondt and David 
Marqués-Ibáñez, 2004).   According to this theory, if banks failed to hedge the interest 
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rate risk, a variation in monetary policy induces the interest rate mismatch of banks. This 
in turn affects the value of bank capital and loan supply. Generally speaking, restrictive 
monetary policy leads to loan defaults, and then has an impact on bank capital.  
2.2 Empirical Literature Review(还没有完成) 
 
3. Sample and variables  
3.1 Data sources 
In this paper, we use OLS regression method in Matlab to test the impact of 
monetary policy on bank lending. We get the panel data from different sources. First, we 
obtain a sample data of banks from the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) 
database during 1994 to 2010. In beginning, we have 1357 banks in our data base. But 
the 2010 data shows there are only 1009 banks for our analysis due to acquisitions, 
mergers and bankrupts. We gain the annual data (including loan, deposit and securities) 
of each bank through the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding 
Companies (FR-Y9C). Then we achieve the short term interest rate from the Federal 
Reserve System database. Finally, we obtain the GDP growth rate in accordance with the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
To evaluate the relationship between bank lending and monetary policy, we 
choose bank’s short-term market interest rate (STIR), bank deposits (DEPO), bank 
securities holdings (SECU), the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) and their 
9 
 
one-period lag as our independence variables. As we expect to compare the results among 
least- capitalized, medium- capitalized and most- capitalized, we divide our data into 
three categories: small, medium and large according to the capital ratio.   
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The following variables are defined by pervious researchers Altunbas et al (2002) 
and Yener Altunbaş, Gabe de Bond and David Marqués-Ibáñez(2004). 
Loan change (△loan) 
△ loan is calculated by dividing a bank’s loan amount by the pervious loan 
amount, then minus 1.  This is the definition used in pervious papers from different 
researchers such as Diana Hancock, Andrew J. Laing and James A. Wilcox(1995) and 
Yener Altunbaş, Gabe de Bond and David Marqués-Ibáñez(2004). We select △loan to 
stand for the bank lending since it is an usual way to estimate the relative loan amount 
between different years. 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Short-term Market Interest Rate (STIR) 
    Short-term Market Interest Rate shows the monetary policy stance, in line with 
most studies. STIR is the interest rate on a loan or other obligation with a maturity of less 
than one year. A commonly followed short-term interest rate is the rate on a Treasury bill. 
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Short-term interest rates are also called money market rates. In theory, if more people 
prefer borrowing money to investing money (which indicates higher bank lending 
amount) the price of borrowing will increase. As a result, Short-term Market Interest Rate 
goes up.  
Why not we use Long-term Market Interest Rate (LTIR)? Since the Interest Rate 
can be affected by other factors in the long run. If we use the LTIR, we cannot conclude 
the direct relation between interest rate and bank lending amount.  
Bank Deposits (DEPO) 
Bank Deposits (DEPO), which is the money placed into a banking institution for 
safekeeping,   indicates the traditional deposit funding effects on loans. In theory, if the 
Bank Deposits increase, banks have more money available for lending. So the bank 
lending amount increases. Also, Bank Deposits exist as a liability on the balance sheet of 
banks and Bank Loan is a asset on the balance sheet. So they should have positive 
correlation in order for the balance sheet to be balanced.  
Bank Securities Holdings (SECU) 
Bank Securities Holdings (SECU) are included because securities and loans are 
both exist as assets in the bank’s balance sheet. There is substitution between liquid 
securities and illiquid loans.   
Growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is for controlling demand factors. 
It is a macroeconomic factor.  
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The independence variables we also use are a number of one-period lagged 
variables, which are to distinguish between instantaneous and lagged responses.  
3.2.3 Other Variables 
Capital Ratios 
Capital Ratio is the key financial ratio measuring a bank's Capital Adequacy or 
financial stability. As a general rule, the higher the ratio, the more sound the bank. A 
bank with a high capital-to-asset ratio is protected against operating losses more than a 
bank with a lower ratio, although this depends on the relative risk of loss at each bank. 
Capital Ratios have long been a valuable tool for assessing the safety and soundness of 
banks. Arturo Estrella, Sangkyun Park, and Stavros Peristiani (2000) discuss the Capital 
Ratios as Predictors of Bank Failure. 
The following figure is the capital ratio in US, Europe and Japan. 
 
It shows the capital ratio in US bank is much higher than other places and there is 
an upward trend.  
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Table 1 is the definition and calculation of the variables. 
3.3 Summary Statistics  
Table 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the summary statistics for least-capitalized, 
medium-capitalized and best-capitalized banks. We divide the banks into 3 categories 
with capital ratio less than 5% as the least-capitalized banks, with capital ratio between 5% 
and 10% as the medium-capitalized banks and with capital ratio more than 10% as the 
best-capitalized banks. As shown in the table, we have 827, 12745 and 5576 observations 
separately.  
The dependent variable is loan change. The mean of loan change is 0.0798, 
0.1139 and 0.0837 which show no obvious trend among three categories. The least-
capitalized banks has the largest standard deviation which shows the stability of least-
capitalized banks is less than medium and best capitalized ones. This is also confirmed by 
independent variables.  
The independent variables we choose are the change and 1 year lagged change of 
short term interest rate, deposit, security and GDP. From three tables we can see that 
there is obvious trend in standard deviation for deposit and security variables. The least-
capitalized banks have largest standard deviation compare to medium and best capitalized 
banks. Considering the situation of the smallest sample size of least-capitalized banks, we 
can say that there are more extreme data in least-capitalized banks than others. Also from 
table 3.2 and 3.3, we can tell that the mean and standard deviation of deposit and security 
change for best-capitalized banks are also smaller than medium ones. This is consistent 
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with our conclusion above that those banks with better capital ratio will also have batter 
stability. 
Table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the correlation matrix of main variables for three 
types of banks. The dependent variable loan change is positively related to all 
independent variables except GDP change. This is interesting because GDP change 
lagged is positively related to loan change. This means when GDP increase, the loan of 
the current year will decrease while it will increase in the coming year. Our guess is the 
industry will operate well in the current year because of the good economy and need to 
expand in the next year. This will be discussed in detail in empirical results part. The loan 
change is most related to deposit change with correlation 0.6830, 0.6865 and 0.6467. This 
shows the bank will increase their loan amount if their deposits increase. Another thing 
which caught our attention is the relationship between GDP change and deposit change. It 
is -0.1546 for least-capitalized banks and -0.0535 and -0.0798 for medium and best 
capitalized banks. This shows people are tend to deposit their money more in larger 
capitalized banks when the economy slowdown because that’s safer. However when 
economy is well they are more willing to deposit in least-capitalized banks since they 
probably will provide better interest rate to attract more deposits.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 To examine the effect of monetary policy on bank lending for different capitalized 
banks, we use a multivariate panel regression model.  The equation is as follows: 
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 Bank Lending is measured by loan change of a bank every year. The  are 
vectors of coefficients to be estimated. We use our 4 independent variables all lagged by 
1 year also to find the level of effects of monetary policy change in period 𝑡-1 on bank 
loan change in period t. We implement Ordinary Least Squares, also known as OLS to 
estimate the regression equation. The software we use to do the OLS is MATLAB.  
 Table 5 shows the regression result for least, medium and best capitalized banks 
separately. The first line of every independent variable is the coefficient and the second 
line is p-value. We use level of significant 95% to do the regression, thus an independent 
variable with p-value less than 0.05 will be considered as significant.  
4.1 Short Term Interest Rate 
 The coefficient for interest rate change is (-0.7827, -0.4705, 0.0058). STIR 
change is significant to least and medium capitalized banks but not significant to best-
capitalized banks. The coefficients also show that the interest rate change will more affect 
banks with less capitalize. Since the banks use short term interest rate to borrow money 
and use long term interest rate to lend money, when short term interest rate decrease, the 
interest rate yield between borrowing and lending will increase. Thus the banks will make 
more profit from lending more money. This is quite risky since the decrease of short term 
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interest rate will very likely to decrease the amount of deposit. For those better 
capitalized banks, they are low risk tolerance, thus more focus on maintain their capital 
ratio and keep safe, so they probably will have their own policy of lending and not to be 
affected by STIR change. The poorly capitalized banks are more willing to take risk if 
they can make more profits. This is the reason why the STIR change is not significant to 
best-capitalized banks and the coefficients show higher level of effect on least-capitalized 
banks than medium-capitalized banks. 
 However, the situation changed for STIR lagged variable. The coefficients are 
(0.9705, 0.7149, 0.7451) and the p-values appear to be significant for all three categories. 
Especially the coefficient for least-capitalized banks, 0.9705, shows the poorly 
capitalized banks cannot maintain their expansion of lending for long time because of the 
lack of deposit and will closely follow the STIR change. Our guess is the increase of 
lending in the same year when STIR decrease is for short time mortgage. The poorly 
capitalized banks will not have enough capital to support the continuous increase of 
lending under the decrease of deposit. On the other hand, the medium and best capitalized 
banks have lower coefficient show that the higher capital ratio can lower the effect of 
decrease of deposit. The long time effect of short term interest rate change will be better 
than the short time effect. This result also shows why Federal Reserve can successfully 
use the short term interest rate to adjust the deposit and lending amount.  
4.2 Deposit 
 The coefficients for deposit change are (0.6450, 0.7996, 0.8223). The variable is 
significant for all three categories. From the coefficients, we can see it is consistent with 
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our conclusion from section 4.1 that the banks with better capitalized will be more likely 
to make their loan change follow the deposit change. The best-capitalized banks are 
lowest risk tolerance. On the other hand, the least capitalized banks have high risk 
tolerance, thus under some specific condition, they will increase lending while the deposit 
decrease in order to achieve high profit and not willing to increase lending much when 
deposit increase because the yield between short term and long term interest rate might 
not be that large and cannot bring them better profit. The relationship between deposit 
and loan change is not that tide for least-capitalized banks. 
 However, the deposit change lagged have coefficients (0.1483, 0.1311, 0.0839) 
and also significant for all three categories. The least-capitalized banks have highest 
relationship to the deposit change previous year. This is also consistent with our 
conclusion in section 4.1 that the least-capitalized banks cannot maintain their loan 
increase while deposit decrease. They have to adjust them to a balance level in the second 
year.  
4.3 Security 
 The coefficients for security change are (-0.0462, -0.1191, -0.1361) and the 
variable is significant for all three categories. The securities are negatively related to loan 
change, this means when security increase, the loan will decrease. Best-capitalized banks 
have the strongest relationship with security. A likely explanation of this is that the best-
capitalized banks have more loan increase come from assets while least ones do not.  
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 The security change lagged for 1-period has p-values (0.8451, 0.4462, 0.4635) 
which are all not significant with 95% level of significance. This shows that the security 
change of a bank has no obvious effect on the bank’s loan change in the next period.  
4.4 GDP 
 The coefficients for GDP change are (0.6396, 0.5042, 0.3115) and the variable is 
significant for all three categories. The least-capitalized banks have the strongest positive 
relationship with GDP change. This means when GDP increase or decrease, the least-
capitalized banks will have largest increase or decrease in lending amount.  Our guess is 
when GDP increase, firms will need to expand and need more mortgage. Least-
capitalized banks are high risk-tolerance, the difficulty to get mortgage in poorly 
capitalized banks will be lower than others. On the other hand, best-capitalized firms may 
refuse to provide large amount of loan to small firms. This will cause firms tend to get the 
amount of loan they need in least-capitalized banks. 
 The conclusion is consistent with the GDP change 1 year lagged variable. The 
coefficients are (2.7130, 1.3083, 0.9776), all significant with positive relationship. 
Similar to GDP change, the coefficient of least-capitalized banks is larger than medium 
and best capitalized banks. The only difference is the relationship is much stronger. This 
shows the GDP change will mostly have effect in the next period. From p-values, we can 
say that the loan change, no matter what level of capital ratio the bank is, is highly related 
to the economy situation.  
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5. Conclusion 
 Our paper estimates the relationship between bank lending and monetary policy 
for different level of bank capitals. We separate the banks into three categories by their 
capital ratio, as least-capitalized, medium-capitalized and best-capitalized banks. We use 
loan change as dependent variable and short term interest rate, deposit, security, GDP 
change and 1 year lagged change as independent variables.  
 For least-capitalized banks, we find they are relatively unstable and high risk 
tolerance. The coefficients are fairly high means the change in independent variables will 
make significant change in loan amount. The least-capitalized banks make their loan 
amount less rely on deposit amount and security change.  
 For best-capitalized banks, we find they are most stable and low risk tolerance 
among three types. The short term interest rate change will not affect its loan policy 
immediately. The loan amount is highly follow deposit and security change. 
 The medium-capitalized banks are the biggest group. Generally the coefficients 
are between least and best ones. The p-value shows the regression result is very 
significant for this group. 
 Overall, the short term interest rate highly affects least and medium capitalized 
banks but not best-capitalized banks. Deposit, security and GDP changes are also very 
significant to all banks with only difference in level of effect. The 1 year lagged variables 
are all significant except the security change lagged variable. Finally, the regression 
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results show that the monetary policy changes will affect all banks’ loan change with 
strongest effect on least-capitalized banks and lowest effect on best-capitalized banks. 
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Appendices 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
  
Loan change (Loan in year t / loan in year t-1) – 1 
  
Security change (Security in year t / security in year t-1) – 1 
  
Deposit change (Deposit in year t / deposit in year t-1) – 1 
  
Capital ratio Equity / assets 
  
Interest rate change Change in the yield on 3-month Treasury securities 
  
GDP growth change Change in GDP growth rate 
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Table 2: Number of banks in the sample 
 
Year Number of observations 
1994 1357 
1995 1390 
1996 1434 
1997 1513 
1998 1602 
1999 1672 
2000 1759 
2001 1865 
2002 2008 
2003 2185 
2004 2301 
2005 2310 
2006 986 
2007 966 
2008 973 
2009 1015 
2010 1009 
 
 
Note: Since 2006, many small banks were no longer required to report to the Federal Reserve. 
That’s why the number of banks in the sample significantly reduced since 2006. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
Table 3.1: Least-Capitalized Banks 
 
 Obs. Mean Std 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Dependent variable       
Loan change 827 0.0798 0.1524 -0.0860 0.0587 0.1902 
       
Independent variables       
Interest rate change 827 -0.0050 0.0144 -0.0125 -0.0037 0.0037 
Interest rate change 
lagged 
827 -0.0073 0.0147 -0.0184 -0.0037 0.0037 
Deposit change 827 0.1006 0.1364 -0.0185 0.0741 0.1922 
Deposit change lagged 827 0.1189 0.1290 0.0203 0.1006 0.2009 
Security change 827 0.0879 0.3004 -0.1478 0.0242 0.2627 
Security change 
lagged 
827 0.1198 0.2976 -0.1175 0.0738 0.3047 
GDP change 827 -0.0001 0.0283 -0.0220 -0.0040 0.0070 
GDP change lagged 827 -0.0085 0.0149 -0.0220 -0.0070 0.0070 
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Table 3.2: Medium-Capitalized Banks 
 
 Obs. Mean Std 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Dependent variable       
Loan change 12745 0.1139 0.1155 0.0367 0.1001 0.1749 
       
Independent variables       
Interest rate change 12745 -0.0027 0.0137 -0.0061 -0.0029 0.0037 
Interest rate change 
lagged 
12745 -0.0029 0.0133 -0.0125 -0.0029 0.0037 
Deposit change 12745 0.1023 0.1078 0.0284 0.0803 0.1500 
Deposit change 
lagged 
12745 0.1099 0.1098 0.0346 0.0862 0.1597 
Security change 12745 0.0958 0.2387 -0.0657 0.0534 0.2138 
Security change 
lagged 
12745 0.1001 0.2412 -0.0625 0.0556 0.2183 
GDP change 12745 -0.0001 0.0184 -0.0070 -0.0010 0.0080 
GDP change lagged 12745 -0.0030 0.0134 -0.0080 -0.0010 0.0070 
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Table 3.3: Best-Capitalized Banks 
 
 Obs. Mean Std 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Dependent variable       
Loan change 5576 0.0837 0.1150 0.0096 0.0670 0.1314 
       
Independent variables       
Interest rate change 5576 -0.0026 0.0133 -0.0061 -0.0029 0.0037 
Interest rate change 
lagged 
5576 -0.0034 0.0135 -0.0125 -0.0029 0.0037 
Deposit change 5576 0.0698 0.1024 0.0062 0.0456 0.0987 
Deposit change lagged 5576 0.0770 0.1065 0.0105 0.0505 0.1055 
Security change 5576 0.0614 0.2178 -0.0792 0.0280 0.1555 
Security change 
lagged 
5576 0.0671 0.2156 -0.0724 0.0336 0.1586 
GDP change 5576 0.0010 0.0198 -0.0070 0.0040 0.0080 
GDP change lagged 5576 -0.0034 0.0140 -0.0080 -0.0010 0.0070 
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Table 4: Correlation 
 
Table 4.1: Least-Capitalized Banks 
 
 Loan 
Change 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
Lagged 
Deposit 
Change 
Deposit 
Change 
Lagged 
Security 
Change 
Security 
Change 
Lagged 
GDP 
Change 
GDP 
Change 
Lagged 
Loan  
Change 
1 0.1903 0.3822 0.6830 0.3818 0.2444 0.2159 -0.0906 0.4940 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
0.1903 1 0.2975 0.1395 0.1039 0.1011 0.0873 0.3645 0.4112 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
Lagged 
0.3822 0.2975 1 0.2608 0.2191 0.1195 0.1337 0.0234 0.5333 
Deposit 
Change 
0.6830 0.1395 0.2608 1 0.3664 0.4457 0.2207 -0.1546 0.4067 
Deposit 
Change 
Lagged 
0.3818 0.1039 0.2191 0.3664 1 0.1939 0.3990 -0.1036 0.2320 
Security 
Change 
0.2444 0.1011 0.1195 0.4457 0.1939 1 0.1330 0.0191 0.1854 
Security 
Change 
Lagged 
0.2159 0.0873 0.1337 0.2207 0.3990 0.1330 1 -0.0788 0.1880 
GDP 
Change 
-0.0906 0.3645 0.0234 -0.1546 -0.1036 0.0191 -0.0788 1 -0.3061 
GDP 
Change 
Lagged 
0.4940 0.4112 0.5333 0.4067 0.2320 0.1854 0.1880 -0.3061 1 
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Table 4.2 Medium-Capitalized Banks 
 
 Loan 
Change 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
Lagged 
Deposit 
Change 
Deposit 
Change 
Lagged 
Security 
Change 
Security 
Change 
Lagged 
GDP 
Change 
GDP 
Change 
Lagged 
Loan  
Change 
1 0.1212 0.1493 0.6865 0.2842 0.0542 0.0988 -0.0299 0.1947 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
0.1212 1 0.2652 0.0411 0.0222 -0.0719 0.0099 0.3016 0.5243 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
Lagged 
0.1493 0.2652 1 0.0357 0.0572 -0.0778 -0.0648 -0.2222 0.3075 
Deposit 
Change 
0.6865 0.0411 0.0357 1 0.2392 0.3919 0.0715 -0.0535 0.0652 
Deposit 
Change 
Lagged 
0.2842 0.0222 0.0572 0.2392 1 0.1079 0.4119 -0.0006 0.0139 
Security 
Change 
0.0542 -0.0719 -0.0778 0.3919 0.1079 1 0.0587 0.0332 -0.0409 
Security 
Change 
Lagged 
0.0988 0.0099 -0.0648 0.0715 0.4119 0.0587 1 0.0741 0.0235 
GDP 
Change 
-0.0299 0.3016 -0.2222 -0.0535 -0.0006 0.0332 0.0741 1 -0.1775 
GDP 
Change 
Lagged 
0.1947 0.5243 0.3075 0.0652 0.0139 -0.0409 0.0235 -0.1775 1 
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Table 4.3 Best-Capitalized Banks 
 
 Loan 
Change 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
Lagged 
Deposit 
Change 
Deposit 
Change 
Lagged 
Security 
Change 
Security 
Change 
Lagged 
GDP 
Change 
GDP 
Change 
Lagged 
Loan  
Change 
1 0.1415 0.1944 0.6467 0.1984 0.0356 0.0700 -0.0576 0.1718 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
0.1415 1 0.2898 0.0196 -0.0012 -0.1015 0.0058 0.2722 0.5128 
Interest 
Rate 
Change 
Lagged 
0.1944 0.2898 1 0.0665 0.0405 -0.1088 -0.0838 -0.2128 0.3286 
Deposit 
Change 
0.6467 0.0196 0.0665 1 0.1981 0.4124 0.0716 -0.0798 0.0262 
Deposit 
Change 
Lagged 
0.1984 -0.0012 0.0405 0.1981 1 0.1044 0.4458 0.0293 -0.0497 
Security 
Change 
0.0356 -0.1015 -0.1088 0.4124 0.1044 1 0.0826 0.0346 -0.0814 
Security 
Change 
Lagged 
0.0700 0.0058 -0.0838 0.0716 0.4458 0.0826 1 0.1013 -0.0123 
GDP 
Change 
-0.0576 0.2722 -0.2128 -0.0798 0.0293 0.0346 0.1013 1 -0.2306 
GDP 
Change 
Lagged 
0.1718 0.5128 0.3286 0.0262 -0.0497 -0.0814 -0.0123 -0.2306 1 
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Table 5: Regression Results 
 
 Least-Capitalized Medium-Capitalized Best-Capitalized 
Interest Rate Change -0.7827 -0.4705 0.0058 
 (0.0170) (0.0000) (0.9579) 
    
Interest Rate Change 
Lagged 
0.9705 0.7149 0.7451 
 (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
Deposit Change 0.6405 0.7996 0.8223 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
Deposit Change 
Lagged 
0.1483 0.1311 0.0839 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
Security Change -0.0462 -0.1191 -0.1361 
 (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
Security Change 
Lagged 
0.0026 0.0024 0.0041 
 (0.8451) (0.4462) (0.4635) 
    
GDP Change 0.6396 0.5042 0.3115 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
GDP Change Lagged 2.7130 1.3083 0.9776 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
Intercept 0.0278 0.0337 0.0335 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
Observations 827 12745 5576 
R-squared 0.5598 0.5679 0.5147 
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Matlab Code for Regression Model 
 
% Clear output 
clear 
close all 
clc 
  
% Load formatted data 
load dataFinalProject 
  
% Do regression for small cap 
Y = smallCap(:,1); 
X = smallCap(:,2:end); 
statSmall = regstats(Y, X, 'linear'); 
coefSmall = statSmall.beta; 
seSmall = statSmall.tstat.se; 
tSmall = statSmall.tstat.t; 
pSmall = statSmall.tstat.pval; 
  
% Do regression for medium cap 
Y = medCap(:,1); 
X = medCap(:,2:end); 
statMed= regstats(Y, X, 'linear'); 
coefMed = statMed.beta; 
seMed = statMed.tstat.se; 
tMed = statMed.tstat.t; 
pMed = statMed.tstat.pval; 
  
% Do regression for large cap 
Y = largeCap(:,1); 
X = largeCap(:,2:end); 
statLarge= regstats(Y, X, 'linear'); 
coefLarge = statLarge.beta; 
seLarge = statLarge.tstat.se; 
tLarge = statLarge.tstat.t; 
pLarge = statLarge.tstat.pval; 
  
% Correlation 
corrSmall = corr(smallCap); 
corrMed = corr(medCap); 
corrLarge = corr(largeCap); 
  
% Statistics Summary 
SmallSum = prctile(smallCap,[25 50 75]); 
MediumSum = prctile(medCap,[25 50 75]); 
LargeSum = prctile(largeCap,[25 50 75]); 
MeanSml = mean(smallCap); 
stdSml = std(smallCap); 
MeanMed = mean(medCap); 
stdMed = std(medCap); 
MeanLrg = mean(largeCap); 
stdLrg = std(largeCap); 
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